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We study the cause of large fluctuations in prices in the London Stock Exchange. This is done
at the microscopic level of individual events, where an event is the placement or cancellation of
an order to buy or sell. We show that price fluctuations caused by individual market orders are
essentially independent of the volume of orders. Instead, large price fluctuations are driven by
liquidity fluctuations, variations in the market’s ability to absorb new orders. Even for the most
liquid stocks there can be substantial gaps in the order book, corresponding to a block of adjacent
price levels containing no quotes. When such a gap exists next to the best price, a new order can
remove the best quote, triggering a large midpoint price change. Thus, the distribution of large
price changes merely reflects the distribution of gaps in the limit order book. This is a finite size
effect, caused by the granularity of order flow: In a market where participants placed many small
orders uniformly across prices, such large price fluctuations would not happen. We show that this
also explains price fluctuations on longer timescales. In addition, we present results suggesting that
the risk profile varies from stock to stock, and is not universal: lightly traded stocks tend to have
more extreme risks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has now been known for more than forty years that
price changes are fat-tailed [1, 15, 21, 36, 39–41, 43, 45–
47, 49, 54], i.e there is a higher probability of extreme
events than in a normal distribution. This is important
for financial risk, since it means that large price fluctu-
ations are much more common than one might expect.
There have been several conjectures about the origin of
fat tails in prices [2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 20, 22, 30, 42, 44, 59, 60].
Most of these theories are either generic mechanisms
for generating power laws, such as multiplicative noise
or maximization of alternative entropies or agent-based
models that make qualitative predictions that are not
very specific.
Two theories that deserve special mention because
they make testable hypotheses about the detailed un-
derlying mechanism are the subordinated random pro-
cess theory of Clark [8] and the recent theory of Gabaix
et al. [20]. Clark’s proposal is that because order ar-
rival rates are highly intermittent, aggregating in a fixed
time interval leads to fat tails in price returns. Gabaix
et al.’s proposal is that high volume orders cause large
price movements. We show that neither of these the-
ories describe large price changes in the London Stock
Exchange1.
Instead, we show that large price fluctuations are
driven by fluctuations in liquidity, i.e. variations in the
response of prices to changes in supply and demand. The
number of agents that participate in the market at any
given time, and thus the number of orders to buy or sell,
is rather small. Even for a heavily traded stock, the typi-
cal number of orders on one side of the book at any given
time is generally around 30. While it is in some cases a
good approximation to regard the market as a statis-
1 For more discussion of the paper of Gabaix et al. see Refer-
ence [17].
2tical system, which can be treated using mathematical
methods from statistical mechanics [5, 6, 13, 18, 56, 58],
markets are far from the thermodynamic limit, and dis-
play strong finite size effects. Fluctuations in orders are
important, but it is not the size of orders that drives
large price changes, but rather the uniformity of their
coverage of price levels. Revealed supply and demand
curves at any instant in time are irregular step-like func-
tions with long flat regions and large jumps. The market
can be regarded as a granular medium, in which the in-
cremental changes in supply and demand are the grains.
The statistical properties of prices depend more on the
fluctuations in revealed supply and demand than on their
mean behavior.
A common assumption is that large price returns r(t)
are asymptotically distributed as a power law. In more
technical terms, letting m(t) be the midprice at time t,
this means that r(t) = logm(t) − logm(t − τ) satisfies
P (r > x) ∼ x−α. P (r > x) is the probability that
r > x, τ is an arbitrary time interval, and f(x) ∼ g(x)
means that f(x) and g(x) scale the same way2 in the
limit x → ∞. α is called the tail exponent. It was ini-
tially thought that α < 2, which is significant because
this would imply that the standard deviation of price
returns does not exist, and that under aggregation inde-
pendent price returns should converge to a Levy stable
distribution [15, 43]. However, most subsequent studies
indicate that α > 2 is more common [1, 36, 39–41, 45–
47, 49, 54]. Nonetheless, it still remains controversial
whether a power law is always the best description of
price returns. In this paper we do not attempt to resolve
this debate. However, we will use power laws as a useful
way to describe the asymptotic behavior of price changes,
in particular to compare the distribution of price changes
for different stocks. Our results suggest that tail expo-
nents vary from stock to stock, and are not universal.
In the remainder of this section we review the con-
tinuous double auction, explaining what we define as
an “event”, and introducing notation that we will use
throughout the rest of the paper. We also discuss the re-
lationship between returns and events, and review related
literature. Section II presents some summary statistics
for the data set. Section III demonstrates that there is
very little difference in the price response of large and
small orders, and that large price fluctuations are driven
by fluctuations in liquidity. This is made more explicit
in Section IV, where we show how gaps in the occupied
price levels in the orderbook lead to large price changes,
and show that the gap distribution closely matches the
return distribution. In Section V we compare the re-
turns triggered by market orders, limit orders, and can-
cellations, and show that they are very similar. Sec-
2 f(x) ∼ g(x) means that limx→∞ L(x)f(x)/g(x) = 1, where L(x)
is a slowly varying function. A slowly varying function L(x) is a
positive function that for every t satisfies limx→∞ L(tx)/L(x) =
1.
tion VI demonstrates that the tail behavior of returns
on the event scale matches the tail behavior on longer
timescales, and that returns in event time and real time
are similar. Section VII studies the behavior of the gap
distribution in more detail, demonstrating that the (at
least approximate) power law behavior we observe is not
driven by fluctuations in the number of orders in the
book, but rather depends on correlations in occupied
price levels. We conclude and offer a few speculations
about the ultimate explanation of large price fluctuations
in Section VIII.
A. Background: Continuous double auction
To understand our results it is essential that the reader
understand the double continuous auction, which is the
standard mechanism for price formation in most mod-
ern financial markets. Agents can place different types
of orders, which can be grouped into two categories: Im-
patient traders submit market orders, which are requests
to buy or sell a given number of shares immediately at
the best available price. More patient traders submit
limit orders, or quotes which also state a limit price pi,
corresponding to the worst allowable price for the trans-
action. (Note that the word “quote” can be used either
to refer to the limit price or to the limit order itself.)
Limit orders often fail to result in an immediate transac-
tion, and are stored in a queue called the limit order book.
Buy limit orders are called bids, and sell limit orders are
called offers or asks. At any given time there is a best
(lowest) offer to sell with price a(t), and a best (high-
est) bid to buy with price b(t). These are also called the
inside quotes or the best prices. The price gap between
them is called the spread s(t) = a(t)−b(t). Prices are not
continuous, but rather change in discrete quanta called
ticks, of size ∆p. The number of shares in an order is
called either its size or its volume.
As market orders arrive they are matched against limit
orders of the opposite sign in order of first price and
then arrival time, as shown in Fig. 1. Because orders are
placed for varying numbers of shares, matching is not
necessarily one-to-one. For example, suppose the best
offer is for 200 shares at $60 and the the next best is for
300 shares at $60.25; a buy market order for 250 shares
buys 200 shares at $60 and 50 shares at $60.25, moving
the best offer a(t) from $60 to $60.25. A high density of
limit orders per price results in high liquidity for market
orders, i.e., it implies a small movement in the best price
when a market order is placed.
There are a variety of different order types defined in
real markets, whose details differ from market to mar-
ket. For our purposes here, any given order can always
be decomposed into two types: We will call any com-
ponent of an order that results in immediate execution
an effective market order, and any component that is not
executed immediately, and is stored in the limit order or-
der book, an effective limit order. For example, consider
3FIG. 1: A schematic illustration of the continuous double
auction mechanism. Limit orders are stored in the limit order
book. We adopt the arbitrary convention that buy orders
are negative and sell orders are positive. As a market order
arrives, it has transactions with limit orders of the opposite
sign, in order of price (first) and time of arrival (second). The
best quotes at prices a(t) or b(t) move whenever an incoming
market order has sufficient size to fully deplete the stored
volume at a(t) or b(t), when new limit orders are placed inside
the spread (when the limit price satisfies b(t) < pi < a(t)) or
when all the orders at the best prices are canceled. Bids and
offers that fall inside the spread become the new best bids
and offers.
a limit order to buy whose limit price pi = a(t). Suppose
the volume at a(t) is 1000 shares, and the volume of the
new limit order is 3000 shares. Then this limit order is
equivalent to an effective market order for 1000 shares,
followed by an effective limit order of 2000 shares with
limit price a(t). In either case the same transactions take
place, and the best prices move to b(t + 1) = a(t) and
a(t+ 1) = a(t) + g(t), where g(t) is the price interval to
the next highest occupied price level. Throughout the
remainder of the paper we will simply call an effective
limit order a “limit order”, and an effective market mar-
ket order a “market order”.
When a market order arrives it can cause changes in
the best prices. This is called market impact or price
impact. Note that the price changes are always in the
same direction: A buy market order will either leave the
best ask the same or make it bigger, and a sell market
order will either leave the best bid the same or make it
smaller. The result is that buy market orders can increase
the midprice m(t) = (a(t) + b(t))/2, and sell orders can
decrease it.
There is no unique notion of price in a real market.
We will let pi be the limit price of a limit order, and
m(t) = (a(t) + b(t))/2 be the midpoint price or mid-
price defined by the best quotes. All the results of
this paper concern the midprice, rather than transac-
tion prices, but at longer timescales this makes very lit-
tle difference, since the midpoint and transaction prices
rarely differ by more than half the spread. The mid-
point price is more convenient to study because it avoids
problems associated with the tendency of transaction
prices to bounce back and forth between the best bid and
ask. Price changes are typically characterized as returns
rτ (t) = logm(t)− logm(t− τ).
B. What causes returns?
In this paper we study changes in the midprice at the
level of individual events. The arrival of three kinds of
events can cause the midprice to change:
• Market orders. A market order bigger than the
opposite best quote widens the spread by increasing
the best ask if it is a buy order, or decreasing the
best bid if it is a sell order.
• Limit orders. A limit order that falls inside the
spread narrows it by increasing the best bid if it is
a buy order, or decreasing the best ask if it is a sell
order.
• Cancellations. A cancellation of the last limit or-
der at the best price widens the spread by either
increasing the best ask or decreasing the best bid.
We prefer to study individual events for several rea-
sons: (1) It removes any ambiguity about time scale,
and makes it easier to compare stocks with different ac-
tivity levels. (2) It minimizes problems associated with
clustered volatility (the positive autocorrelation of the
absolute value of price changes). Clustered volatility is
also driven by variations in event arrival rates, so its ef-
fect is weaker when the time lag between price changes is
measured in terms of number of intervening events. (3)
Individual events are the most fundamental level of de-
scription – returns on any longer scale can be built out
of returns on an event scale. We will generally measure
time in terms of event time: the time interval between
events t1 and t2 is measured as the number of interven-
ing events plus one. (One is added so that two adjacent
events comprise an event time interval of one).
Analysis at the event scale is particularly useful under
the assumption that large price fluctuations are asymp-
totically power law distributed because of the invariance
properties of power laws under aggregation. If two in-
dependent variables X and Y both have power law tails
with exponents αX and αY , then the variable Z = X+Y
also has a power law tail with exponent min(αX , αY ).
Thus, if we show that returns at the level of individ-
ual events have power law tails with exponent α and if
there are not strong and persistent correlations, returns
on any longer event time scale should also have power
law tails with exponent α. In fact, α appears to be the
same whether returns are measured in event time or real
time (see Section VI).
4C. Review of previous work
There is considerable prior work using limit order data
to address questions about market microstructure. For
example, in a very early study Niederhoffer and Osborne
discussed the granularity of revealed supply and demand,
and showed orders tend to cluster at particular prices
[48]. Clustering of limit orders, as well as stop-loss and
take-profit orders is also studied in references [32, 33, 50].
Of particular relevance is the work of Biais, Hillion and
Spatt [4] who for the Paris Bourse document several prop-
erties of order flow, including the concentration of orders
near the best prices. They study the relation between
order flow and the dynamics of prices, and mention the
existence of gaps in the limit order book. Another rel-
evant observation is made by Knez and Ready [35] and
Petersen and Umlauf [52] who demonstrate that for the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) the most important
conditioning variable for price impact is the size of an
order relative to the volume at the best price. Goldstein
and Kavajecz [23] document the effect of changes in tick
size on limit order book depth, while several theoreti-
cal papers justify the existence of positive bid-ask spread
and investigate the motivations for placing limit orders
as opposed to market orders [9, 19, 25, 29, 31, 51]. In
addition we should mention recent empirical studies by
Coppejans and Domowitz [11] and Coppejans, Domowitz
and Madhaven [12] that document variations in liquidity
and comovements of liquidity with returns and volatility.
Our work adds to this literature by investigating the
relationship between order placement and price move-
ment at the level of individual events. Our motivation
is to understand what drives large price movements, to
gain insight into the fat tails of price returns. A relevant
paper in this regard is the work of Plerou et al. [53], who
showed that for the NYSE in a fixed time interval the
scaling behavior in the standard deviation of individual
price fluctuations roughly matches that of price fluctua-
tions, and dominates over fluctuations in the number of
events. This seems to contradict the later conclusions of
the same authors in Gabaix et al. [20].
II. DATA
In order to a have a representative sample of high
volume stocks we select 16 companies traded on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the 4-year period
1999-2002. The stocks we analyzed are Astrazeneca
(AZN), Baa (BAA), BHP Billiton (BLT), Boots Group
(BOOT), British Sky Broadcasting Group (BSY), Dia-
geo (DGE), Gus (GUS), Hilton Group (HG.), Lloyds Tsb
Group (LLOY), Prudential (PRU), Pearson (PSON),
Rio Tinto (RIO), Rentokil Initial (RTO), Reuters Group
(RTR), Sainsbury (SBRY), Shell Transport & Trading
Co. (SHEL). These stocks were selected because they
have high volume and they are all continuously traded
during the full period. Table I gives a summary of the
TABLE I: Summary statistics of the 16 stocks we study for
the period 1999-2002. The columns give the number of events
of each type, in thousands. All events are “effective” events
– see the discussion in Section IA.
tick market orders limit orders cancellations total
AZN 652 2,067 1,454 4,173
BAA 226 683 487 1,397
BLT 297 825 557 1,679
BOOT 246 711 501 1,458
BSY 404 1,120 726 2,250
DGE 527 1,329 854 2,709
GUS 244 734 518 1,496
HG. 228 676 472 1,377
LLOY 723 1,664 1,020 3,407
PRU 448 1,227 821 2,496
PSON 373 1,063 734 2,170
RIO 381 1,122 771 2,274
RTO 276 620 389 1,285
RTR 479 1,250 820 2,549
SBRY 284 805 561 1,650
SHEL 717 4,137 3,511 8,365
total 6,505 20,033 14,196 40,734
number of different events for the 16 stocks3.
The London Stock Exchange consists of two parts:
The completely automated electronic downstairs market
(SETS) and the upstairs market (SEAQ). The trading
volume is split roughly equally between the two mar-
kets. We study the downstairs market because we have
a record of each action by each trader as it occurs. In
contrast, trades in the upstairs market are arranged in-
formally between agents, and are printed later. There
are no designated market makers for SETS; however, any
member of the exchange is free to act as a market maker
by posting simultaneous bids and offers. This should be
contrasted with the NYSE, for example, which has a de-
signed specialist to trade each stock4 During the period
we study the book is fully transparent, i.e. all orders in
the book are fully revealed5.
Trading begins each day with an opening auction.
There is a period leading up to the opening auction in
which orders are placed but no transactions take place.
The market is then cleared and for the remainder of the
day (except for occasional exceptional periods) there is a
continuous auction. We remove all data associated with
the opening auction, and analyze only orders placed dur-
3 We have observed similar results on less liquid stocks, except
that the statistics tend to be poorer, and as we discuss in Sec-
tion IV, e.g. Figure 8, less liquid stocks appear to have lower tail
exponents.
4 Another difference between the two markets is that clearing in
the LSE is fully automated and instantaneous; in contrast, in
the NYSE clearing is done manually, creating an uncertainty in
response times.
5 In 2003 the LSE began to allow “iceberg orders”, which contain
a hidden component that is only revealed as the exposed part of
the order is removed.
5ing the continuous auction.
An analysis of the limit order placement shows that
in our dataset approximately 35% of the effective limit
orders are placed inside the book (pi > a(t) or pi < b(t)).
33% are placed at the best prices (pi = b(t) or pi = a(t)),
and 32% are placed inside the spread (b(t) < pi < a(t)).
This is roughly true for all the stocks except for SHEL,
for which the percentages are 71%, 18% and 11%, respec-
tively6 Moreover for all the stocks the properties of buy
and sell limit orders are approximately the same.
In this dataset cancellation occurs roughly 32% of the
time at the best price and 68% of the time inside the
book. This is quite consistent across stocks and between
the cancellation of buy and sell limit orders. The only
significant deviation is once again SHEL, for which the
percentages are 14% and 86%.
III. FLUCTUATIONS IN LIQUIDITY DRIVE
THE TAILS
The assumption that large price changes are caused by
large market orders is very natural. A very large market
order will dig deeply into the limit order book, causing
transactions at many price levels, increasing the spread,
and changing the midprice. Surprisingly, this is not the
cause of most large price changes. Instead, as we will
demonstrate in this section, most large price changes are
due to discrete fluctuations in liquidity, manifested by
gaps in filled price levels in the limit order book. Large
price changes caused by large orders are very rare, and
play an insignificant role in determining the statistical
properties of price changes.
In this section we will focus on price changes caused
by market orders, and in Section V we will discuss price
changes due to limit orders and cancellations.
A. Large returns are not caused by large orders
We first demonstrate that most large returns are not
caused by the arrival of large market orders. The proba-
bility density function of price returns that are caused
by market orders can trivially be written as p(r) =∫
p(r|ω)p(ω)dω, where p(r), p(ω) and p(r|ω) are the
probability density functions for returns r, market order
size ω, and returns given market order size. The con-
ditional probability p(r|ω) characterizes the response of
6 For Paris Stock Exchange from 1994 Biais, Hillion and Spatt
[4] observed 42% of the orders inside the spread, 23% at the
best, and 35% inside the book. We do not know why SHEL is
anomalous, though it is worth noting that is the most heavily
traded stock in the sample, a close proxy is also traded on the
NYSE, and it has the second largest tail exponent among the 16
stocks chosen for the study.
prices to new orders, and can be viewed as the probabil-
ity density of market impacts, or alternatively, as char-
acterizing the distribution of liquidity for market orders.
When a market order of size ω arrives the midprice will
move if ω is larger than or equal to the volume at the
matching best price (i.e. the bid for sell market orders
and the ask for buy market orders). In the limit of con-
tinuous prices we can trivially write
p(r|ω) = (1− g(ω))δ(r) + g(ω)f(r|ω) (1)
where δ(.) is the Dirac delta function7 and g(ω) is the
probability that the midprice moves as a function of the
order size ω. The function f(r|ω) is the probability of a
price shift r, conditioned on the midprice moving in re-
sponse to an order of volume ω. g(ω) and f(r|ω) behave
quite differently. g(ω) depends strongly on ω. For the
LSE it scales roughly as g(ω) ∼ ω0.3, about the same as
the average market impact. In contrast, f(r|ω) is surpris-
ingly independent of the volume ω, in the sense that the
unconditional fluctuations in r dominate the dependence
on ω.
To demonstrate this in Figure 2 we show the cumu-
lative probability for nonzero price returns conditioned
on order size, i.e. F (r > X |ω) = ∫∞X f(r|ω)dr for sev-
eral different ranges of market order size ω. The orders
are sorted by size into five groups with roughly the same
number of orders in each group. The distributions for
each range of ω are roughly similar, both for individual
stocks such as AZN, and for the pool. Each curve ap-
proximately approaches a power law for large r indepen-
dent of ω, illustrating that the key property determining
large price returns is fluctuations in market impact, and
that the role of the volume of the order initiating a price
change is minor. For the pooled stock result, for large re-
turns the curves for large order size tend to be on top of
those for small order size, illustrating a weak dependence
on order size, but this is relatively small, and not visible
in the results for individual stocks. Although we do not
present them here, using the TAQ database we have ob-
tained similar results for a small sample of stocks traded
in the NYSE, suggesting that this behavior is not specific
to the LSE8. This is particularly interesting given the sig-
nificant differences in the structure of the NYSE, and also
because the TAQ data set includes upstairs trades.
To reinforce this point, in Figure 3 we show p(ω|r >
X), the probability of a market order of size ω condi-
tioned on the return being greater than a certain thresh-
old X . We do this for the stock Astrazeneca (AZN) for
several different values of X , getting virtually the same
curve independent of X . The distribution of order sizes
7 The Dirac delta function δ(x) is defined so that
∫
δ(x) = 1 over
any domain that includes 0 and
∫
δ(x) = 0 otherwise.
8 Note added in press: Based on five minute averages, Weber and
Rosenow [63] also see that liquidity is the dominant effect, using
data from NYSE and Island.
6FIG. 2: Dependence of returns on order size. F (r > X|ω) is
the probability of a return r > X conditioned on the order
size ω and on the fact that the price shift is nonzero. Results
shown are for buy orders, but similar results are seen for sell
orders. The orders are sorted by size into five groups with
roughly the same number of orders in each group. Ranging
from small orders to large orders, the curves are black, red,
green, blue, and magenta. In panel (a) we show the result for
AZN and in panel (b) we show the average over the pool of
16 stocks described in Table I. For the pooled data for each
stock we normalize the order volume to the sample mean, and
then combine the data. Each curve approximately approaches
a power law for large r independent of ω, illustrating that the
key property determining large price returns is fluctuations in
market impact, and that the role of the volume of the order
initiating a price change is minor.
that generate large returns are essentially the same as
those that generate small returns. Similar results are ob-
tained for all the stocks in our sample. Thus, it seems
that order size does not play an important role in gener-
ating large returns.
Gabaix et al. [20] have recently proposed that large
returns can be explained by assuming the market impact
density function p(r|ω) is sharply peaked around a cen-
FIG. 3: p(ω|r > X), the distribution of market order sizes
conditioned on generating a return greater than X, for the
stock AZN. The values of X correspond to the 50 percentile
(red), 90 percentile (blue), and 99 percentile (green) of the
return distribution. The black line is the unconditional dis-
tribution p(ω). The jumps are due to the tendency to place
orders in round numbers of shares.
tral value9 kω1/2, so that it can be approximated as a
Dirac delta function δ(r− kω1/2). The result of Figure 2
makes it clear that the sharply peaked assumption is a
poor approximation – the distribution is quite broad, in
the sense that the conditional distribution p(r|ω) ≈ p(r),
and p(r) is not sharply peaked.
B. Volume dependence of mean market impact
From a variety of previous studies it is clear that the
mean market impact is an increasing function of ω [14, 16,
26, 27, 34, 38, 55–57, 61, 62]. How do we reconcile this
with our claim that the distribution of market impact
is almost independent of volume? The key is that the
main effect of changing order volume is to change the
probability that the price will move, with very little effect
on how much it moves. From Eq. (1) one easily obtains
E(r|ω) = g(ω)
∫
f(r|ω)r dr ∝ g(ω) (2)
9 Analyses of several markets make it clear that the mean response
of prices to orders varies considerably from market to market,
and is not in general well characterized by a square root law [17,
18, 38, 56]. It is also worth noting that the volume distribution
in Figure 3 does not appear to have a power law tail. This is true
of all the stocks in our sample. In contrast, power law tails are
observed for stocks in the NYSE [24], and this was also observed
this to be true for upstairs data in the LSE (Lillo and Farmer,
unpublished). See also the discussion in [37].
7where for the last proportionality relationship we have
used the result from Figure 2 that f(r|ω) is almost in-
dependent of ω. Thus, the expected price change scales
like the probability of a price change, a relationship that
we have verified for both the LSE and the NYSE. How-
ever this variation is still small in comparison with the
intrinsic variation of returns; the mean market impact
of a very large order is less than the average size of the
spread, but the largest market impacts are often more
than ten times this large.
C. Correlations between order size and liquidity
One possible explanation of the independence of price
response and order size is that there is a strong correla-
tion between order size and liquidity. There is an obvious
strategic reason for this: Agents who are trying to trans-
act large amounts split their orders and execute them a
little at a time, watching the book, and taking whatever
liquidity is available as it enters. Thus, when there is a
lot of volume in the book they submit large orders, and
when there is less volume, they submit small orders. This
effect tends to even out the price response of large and
small orders. We will see that this effect indeed exists,
but it is only part of the story, and is not the primary
determinant of the behavior we observe here.
In fact, the unconditional correlation between market
order size and volume at the best is rather small. For
AZN, for example, it is about 1%. However, if we re-
strict the sample to orders that change the midprice, the
correlation soars to 86%. The reason for this is that for
orders that do not change the price, there is essentially
no correlation between order size and volume at the best.
For the rarer case of orders that do change the price, in
contrast, most market orders exactly match the volume
at the best. As shown in Table II, for the stocks in our
sample, 86% of the buy orders that change the price ex-
actly match the volume at the best price. (This is 85%
for sell orders.)
The relationship between the volume of market orders
and the best price becomes more evident with a nonlinear
analysis. Figure 4 shows E(ω|Vbest), where ω is the mar-
ket order size and Vbest is the volume at the corresponding
best price. We see in this figure that the expected order
size is nonzero even for the smallest values of Vbest. It
grows monotonically with Vbest, but with a slope that is
substantially less than one, and a roughly concave shape.
This makes the nonlinear correlation between order size
and liquidity clear. However, in the following section we
will see that the dependence of order size on liquidity is
not strong enough to substantially suppress large price
fluctuations.
% of nonzero return % of nonzero return
equal to first gap with ω = Vbest
tick sell buy sell buy
AZN 94.3 99.6 83.7 90.1
BAA 95.9 99.1 86.2 87.0
BLT 95.0 99.2 85.8 85.6
BOOT 95.9 99.2 85.7 84.7
BSY 94.3 99.7 85.0 88.0
DGE 96.3 99.7 86.5 87.4
GUS 95.8 99.5 85.0 83.5
HG. 95.9 99.5 85.8 83.0
LLOY 97.3 99.8 88.4 88.6
PRU 95.9 99.5 85.5 78.1
PSON 93.1 99.6 81.2 86.2
RIO 95.7 99.7 84.6 86.4
RTO 96.1 99.5 84.4 85.3
RTR 93.0 99.7 83.5 85.4
SBRY 95.6 99.4 85.3 83.2
SHEL 98.7 99.9 93.0 92.8
average 95.6 99.5 85.6 86.0
TABLE II: Summary table of the percentage of the time that
nonzero changes in the best prices are equal to the first gap
(left) and that the market order volume ω exactly matches
the volume at the corresponding best price Vbest (right). As-
suming a Bernoulli process the sample errors are the order of
0.1− 0.2%.
D. Liquidity fluctuations drive price fluctuations
In this section we demonstrate in concrete terms that
price fluctuations are driven almost entirely by liquidity
fluctuations. To do this we study the virtual market im-
pact, which is a useful tool for probing the supply and
demand curves defined by the limit order book. Whereas
the true market impact p(r|ω) tells us about the distri-
bution of impacts of actual market orders, as discussed
in Section III A, the virtual market impact is the price
change that would occur at any given time if a market or-
der of a given size were to be submitted. More formally,
at any given time t the limit orders stored in the order
book define a revealed supply function S(pi, t) and re-
vealed demand function D(pi, t). Let V (pi, t) be the total
volume of orders stored at price pi. The revealed supply
function is
S(pi, t) =
i=pi∑
i=a(t)
V (i, t) (3)
The revealed supply function is non-decreasing, and so
for any fixed t has a well defined inverse pi(S, t). The
virtual market impact is the price shift caused by a
hypothetical order of size S, e.g. for buy orders it is
pi(S, t)− a(t). The virtual market impact for sell market
orders can be defined in terms of the revealed demand
in a similar manner. By sampling at different values of
t, for any fixed hypothetical order size we can create a
sample distribution of virtual market impacts. This nat-
urally depends on the sampling times, but these can be
chosen to match any given set of price returns.
8FIG. 4: The dependence of order size on liquidity. Liquidity is
measured as the volume at the best price, which is binned into
deciles with roughly equal numbers of events. The vertical
axis shows the mean market order volume for each decile, and
the horizontal shows the volume at the best. The units of both
axes are thousands of shares. The ranges shown around each
point indicate one standard deviation (and are not standard
errors). The dashed line has slope 1 and serves as a point of
comparison.
In Figure 5 we show the cumulative distribution of vir-
tual market impacts for the stock AZN for several differ-
ent values of D, corresponding to different quantiles of
market order size. The cumulative distributions define a
set of approximately parallel curves. They are shifted as
one would expect from the fact that larger hypothetical
order sizes tend to have larger virtual market impacts.
These curves are similar in shape to the distribution of
returns. Most striking, for the median market order size,
the curves are almost identical. We see similar results
for all the stocks in our sample. This demonstrates quite
explicitly that the distribution of returns is determined
by properties of the limit order book, and that the typ-
ical price return corresponds to the price response to an
order of typical size. The fact that the price distribution
is so close to the virtual market impact of a typical order
shows that correlations between order size and liquidity
are not important in determining price fluctuations.
IV. GRANULARITY OF SUPPLY AND
DEMAND
At first sight, the behavior described in the previous
section seems baffling: How can market order size be so
unimportant to price response? In this section we show
how this is due to granularity of revealed supply and
demand, which causes large fluctuations in liquidity.
The cause of this puzzling behavior is fluctuations
in occupied price levels in the limit order book. In
FIG. 5: The cumulative probability distribution P (r > x) of
virtual market impacts for the stock AZN, based on samples of
the limit order book taken just before the arrival of a market
order. From left to right the continuous lines are the virtual
market impact for hypothetical buy orders of size ω = 100
shares (red), ω = 1, 600 shares (green), ω = 8, 700 shares
(blue), and ω = 25, 000 shares (magenta); these correspond
to the 0.1, 0.5, 0.9, and 0.99 quantiles of market order size.
These are compared to the average distribution of returns
(black dashed), which is very similar to the virtual market
impact for the 0.5 quantile. Note that we have discarded
cases in which the virtual market impact is undefined due to
excessively large hypothetical market order volume, but these
comprise only about 3% of the events.
particular, one can define the size of the first gap g
as the absolute difference between the best log price
pibest and the log price of the next best quote, pinext as
g = | log pibest − log pinext|. In Figure 6 we show a typical
set of events before and after a large price fluctuation.
In panel (a) we see that there is a large first gap on the
sell side of the limit order book. In panel (b) we see the
configuration of the book an event later, after a market
order or exactly the same size has removed all the vol-
ume at the best ask. This results in a large change in the
midpoint price. Thus, the large return simply reflects a
large gap inside the book that has been revealed by the
removal of the best ask. We find that this is the typical
behavior underlying almost all large returns.
As already shown in Table II, typically about 85% of
market orders that result in price changes exactly match
the volume at the best price. Furthermore, as shown in
the first two columns of this table, when they do exceed
the volume at the best price, it is quite rare that they
penetrate the next occupied level. For buy (sell) market
orders, on average 95.5% (99.5%) of the nonzero shifts in
the best price are exactly equal to the first gap. Interest-
ingly there is a significant asymmetry between buy and
sell. Traders act to minimize their transaction costs, so
that jumps of more than one gap are rare, particularly
for sell orders. (However, as we stressed earlier, the re-
9FIG. 6: A typical configuration of the limit order book for
AZN before and after a large price fluctuation. The two panels
plot the volume (in shares) of limit orders at each price level;
sell limit orders are shown as positive, and buy limit orders as
negative. In panel (a) we see that there is a large gap between
the best ask price and the next highest occupied price. The
arrival of a market order to buy removes all the volume at
the best ask, giving the new limit order book configuration
shown in panel (b), which has a much higher best ask price
than previously.
turn distribution can be generated by a constant order of
median size – this correlation is interesting, but not es-
sential). Note that the trader initiating the change does
not pay a large spread – that would only happen to the
next trader, if she were to immediately place a market
order10.
This is by far the most common scenario that gen-
erates large price changes. In Figure 7(a) we compare
the distribution of the first gaps to the distribution of
price returns for the stock AZN. We see that the dis-
tributions are very similar. For the first gap size the
tail index α = 2.52 ± 0.07, and for the return distribu-
tion α = 2.57± 0.08, showing that the scaling behaviors
are similar. However, the similarity is not just evident
in the scaling behavior – the match is good throughout
the entire range, illustrating that most of the large price
changes are caused by events of this type. Panel (b) of
Figure 7 shows the same comparison for the pool of 16
stocks. The agreement in this case is even more strik-
ing11.
10 In general after a large shift in the bid or ask price, the next
orders tend to be limit orders, but we have not yet been able
to study the statistical properties of the sequence of subsequent
events in detail. See [4, 9, 25, 29], and [52] for an empirical study
of the role of quote size after a market order.
11 We have also studied the distribution of higher order gaps. Mov-
ing away from the best price pi0, the nth order gap for n = 1, 2, . . .
can be recursively defined as gn = | log pin−1− log pin|, where pin
FIG. 7: The cumulative distribution P (g > x) of the size of
first gaps g (red continuous line), compared to the cumulative
distribution of returns generated by market orders P (r > x)
(black dashed line). Panel (a) refers to buy market orders
for AZN, in double logarithmic scale to highlight the tail be-
havior. The two distributions are very similar. The result is
even more impressive when we consider the average over the
16 stocks described in Table I (Panel (b))
To demonstrate that the correspondence in the above
figure is not just a coincidence for AZN, we have com-
puted the tail exponents for returns and first gap size for
all 16 stocks in our data set. We do this using a Hill esti-
mator [28] by considering the largest
√
n returns, where
n is the size of the sample. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 8, where we plot the tail exponents of returns against
those of first gaps. The points cluster tightly along the
diagonal, making it clear that there is a strong positive
correlation (R2 = 0.93) between the gap tail exponents
is the nth occupied price level. Interestingly, we find that the
tail behavior of higher order gaps is the same as that of g1.
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FIG. 8: A comparison of tail exponents α for returns (hori-
zontal axis) vs. tail exponents for the first gap (vertical axis).
The first gaps are sampled immediately preceding the market
order that triggers the return. This is done for all the stocks
in Table I, and includes both the buy and sell side of the
limit order book. We use red circles for low liquidity stocks,
blue squares for medium liquidity stocks, and green triangles
for high liquidity stocks. Empty symbols refer to sell market
orders and filled symbols to buy market orders. The black
dashed line is the linear regression. We see that there is a
clear positive relationship between the number of orders and
the tail exponent.
and the return tail exponents; a least squares linear fit
has a slope of 0.98±0.05, and we are unable to reject the
null hypothesis that the tail exponents of the gaps and
returns are drawn from the same distribution.
It is worth noting that lightly traded stocks tend to
have a smaller tail exponent than heavily traded stocks.
This is already clear in Figure 8, where we have used a
color coding to identify stocks of different volume. To
investigate this more quantitatively, in Figure 9 we plot
the tail exponent of price changes against the number of
market orders for each stock in the sample. While the
relationship is noisy, there is a clear positive trend; the
slopes of the linear fits to positive and negative returns
are both highly statistically significant. The tail expo-
nents vary from about 1.6 to 2.8, whereas the error bars
are more than a factor of ten smaller than the range of
variation12. This suggests that the tail exponent is not
universal. Not surprisingly, stocks that are more heavily
traded tend to display less extreme risk than stocks that
are lightly traded.
12 Table III gives error bars for tail exponent estimations based on
absolute returns (including both buy and sell events), while Fig-
ures 7 and 8 are based on buy and sell returns taken separately,
but the error bars are comparable.
FIG. 9: Dependence of the tail exponent of price changes
on the number of market orders, for the data of Figure 8.
Black circles are for positive returns (caused by buy market
orders), and red triangles are for negative returns (caused by
sell market orders). The steeper red curve is the fit to negative
returns and the black curve the fit to positive returns.
V. LIMIT ORDERS AND CANCELLATIONS
We have so far considered only returns caused by mar-
ket orders. In this section we will discuss returns caused
by limit orders and cancellations, and show that they
are statistically indistinguishable from those caused by
market orders.
The distribution of returns caused by limit orders, mar-
ket orders, and cancellations for AZN is shown in Fig-
ure 10. The distributions are quite similar. To make
the analysis more quantitative, we compute the tail ex-
ponents for the 16 stocks in the sample. Table III shows
the Hill estimates for returns caused by market orders,
limit orders and cancellations. The table shows clearly
that the tail exponents for the three distributions are very
close: For all 16 stocks the estimated tail exponents are
well within the 95% confidence intervals. On the other
hand Table III shows that there is a much larger variation
across stocks.
Why are the distributions of different events so similar?
The correspondence between returns caused by market
orders and returns caused by cancellations is not surpris-
ing. In terms of the effect on best prices, removal of the
volume at the best price by cancellation is equivalent to
removal by a market order, in both cases creating a price
change equal in size to the first gap. However, for a limit
order this is not so obvious: A limit order that falls in-
side the spread decreases the spread, and causes a price
change in the opposite direction from market orders and
cancellations. To investigate this we have studied the
distribution of the spread, which also appears to be a
power law, but with a larger tail exponent. At this point
the reason for the close correspondence between the re-
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FIG. 10: A comparison of the distribution of absolute returns
(including both buy and sell orders) caused by limit orders,
market orders, and cancellations for AZN. The black circles
are for market orders, the blue triangles are for limit orders,
and the red squares are for cancellations.
TABLE III: Hill estimator of the return caused by market
orders, limit orders and cancellations. We analyzed the top
percentile and give 95% confidence intervals. The confidence
intervals assume the samples are uncorrelated, and so may be
over-optimistic.
tick Market orders Limit orders Cancellations
AZN 2.57± 0.08 2.56± 0.07 2.57 ± 0.06
BAA 1.77± 0.06 1.77± 0.08 1.76 ± 0.08
BLT 1.8± 0.1 1.8± 0.1 1.8± 0.1
BOOT 1.80± 0.07 1.80± 0.07 1.79 ± 0.08
BSY 2.28± 0.04 2.25± 0.06 2.26 ± 0.06
DGE 2.31± 0.06 2.31± 0.07 2.31 ± 0.07
GUS 1.80± 0.09 1.80± 0.07 1.80 ± 0.07
HG. 1.7± 0.1 1.7± 0.1 1.66 ± 0.07
LLOY 2.72± 0.03 2.72± 0.04 2.72 ± 0.05
PRU 2.20± 0.06 2.20± 0.07 2.20 ± 0.06
PSON 1.9± 0.1 1.9± 0.1 1.91 ± 0.09
RIO 1.83± 0.09 1.82± 0.08 1.83 ± 0.07
RTO 1.73± 0.09 1.73± 0.08 1.73 ± 0.07
RTR 2.45± 0.04 2.44± 0.05 2.45 ± 0.03
SBRY 1.89± 0.07 1.88± 0.07 1.88 ± 0.07
SHEL 2.62± 0.04 2.61± 0.07 2.62 ± 0.04
turns generated by limit and market orders remains un-
explained.
VI. PRICE CHANGES ON LONGER
TIMESCALES
One can naturally ask whether the microscopic event
level analysis we have presented here explains the statis-
tical properties of price changes over longer and/or fixed
time horizons. The timescale for the analyses we have
presented here is quite fast: For Astrazeneca, for exam-
FIG. 11: Price returns aggregated on different timescales and
for different number of trades. The price return is defined as
logm(t) − logm(t − τ ), where τ is from left to right 1, 2, 4,
8, 16 and 32 market orders (continuous lines) and 5, 10, and
20 minutes (dashed lines). The data is for AZN, based on
absolute returns (both buy and sell).
ple, within the period of this dataset there are on average
about eight market orders every five minutes, but due to
highly uneven rates of event arrival, it is not uncommon
that many events arrive within the same second. It is
natural to question whether events on this timescale re-
flect the properties of longer timescales, e.g. on the daily
timescale of many other studies. Given that order ar-
rival is highly clustered in time, it is also natural to ask
whether a description in event time also provides an ex-
planation in real time. We now address both of these
questions.
The permanence of these price movements can be seen
through the continuity between price returns on the sin-
gle event scale and the multiple event scale. Figure 11
shows the return density function for AZN for 1, 2, 4,
8, 16, and 32 market order arrivals, as well as for 5, 10,
and 20 minute timescales. Each curve consists of a non-
power law central behavior crossing over to an approxi-
mate power law tail behavior. We see that the tails of all
the distributions are quite similar, though the crossover
point from the central behavior to the tail behavior in-
creases for longer timescales. The regularity of the move-
ment in the crossover point as we vary the timescale,
and the similarity of the tail behavior across a range of
timescales, indicates that the tail properties on the single
event scale are reflected on larger scales (at least as large
as 20 minutes). Also, this figure makes it clear that the
behavior in real time is essentially the same as the be-
havior in event time. We see similar behavior for all the
stocks in our sample. Since other studies have shown the
continuity between timescales from 10 minutes to as long
as a month [39, 46, 54], it seems clear that an explanation
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at the level of single events is sufficient13. This is par-
ticularly striking, given that on a longer timescale other
processes may become important, such as order splitting.
Figure 11 suggests that for understanding the statistical
properties of prices these can be neglected.
The fact that we observe essentially identical distri-
butions when we aggregate over individual transactions
or over fixed time rules out any explanation of fat tails
for price returns based on a subordinated random pro-
cess, as was suggested by Clark [8]. While fluctuations
in the number of events in a given length of time might be
quite important for other phenomena, such as clustered
volatility, they are clearly not important in determining
the price return distribution.
VII. CORRELATIONS IN OCCUPIED SITES
A natural hypothesis about the origin of the large gap
distributions involves fluctuations in the number of occu-
pied sites in the order book. If there are only a few orders
in the book, so that it is mostly empty, we naturally ex-
pect large gaps to exist. Perhaps the approximate power
for the gap distribution can be explained by a similar
power law in the number of occupied sites? In this sec-
tion we show that this is not the case, but rather that the
power law behavior depends on correlations in occupied
price levels.
Interestingly, we do find evidence of power law scaling
in the number of occupied price levels. Figure 12 (a)
shows the probability density function p(N), where N
is the number of occupied price levels in the order book
at any given time. The low N region is well fit by a
power-law p(N) ∼ Nβ over about two decades.
However, the fluctuations in the number of orders
stored in the book cannot explain the power law behav-
ior of prices, because the tail exponent of the power law
behavior of the gap distribution near zero is much too
large. If we assume that the location of order deposition
is uncorrelated, then for order arrival on a bounded do-
main gap size should be proportional to 1/N . But with
p(N) ∼ Nβ and g ∼ 1/N , p(g) ∼ g−(β+2). For β ≈ 5.5
this results in p(g) ∼ g−7.5. In contrast, the empiri-
cally observed scaling exponent for the density for AZN
is about 3.5.
Surprisingly, the distribution of gap size shows approx-
imate power law scaling, independent of N . This is illus-
trated for AZN in Figure 12(b), where we plot the prob-
ability of gap size conditioned on N , p(g|N), for several
different values of N . The same approximate power law
scaling behavior is seen independent of N . The approx-
13 We have studied the response to individual events, and see some
evidence for mean reversion of large price changes. However, the
results of Figure 11 make it clear that these are not sufficient to
undo the initial change.
FIG. 12: The effect of the finite number of orders for the
stock AZN. Panel (a) shows the unconditional distribution of
the number of occupied price levels for buy orders, plotted on
double logarithmic scale. The dashed line is the best fit of
the low N region with a functional form p(N) ∝ Nβ . Panel
(b) shows the probability density of first gap sizes conditional
on the number of occupied price levels, p(g|N). We divide
the sample in four subsamples according to the value of N .
Specifically, we have 0 < N ≤ 15 (black circles), 15 < N ≤ 30
(red squares), 30 < N ≤ 45 (green diamonds), and 45 <
N ≤ 60 (blue triangles). Surprisingly, the first gap size shows
approximate power law behavior even when the number of
occupied sites is very large.
imate power law behavior is evident even with as many
as 60 occupied sites on one side of the book. Consid-
ering that it is rare for orders to be placed more than
100 price ticks away from the best price, this illustrates
that occupied sites display nontrivial correlations, which
are essential for explaining large price fluctuations. This
conclusion is reinforced by studies we have done compar-
ing the real distribution of occupied levels with models
based on IID order placement, which do not reproduce
the power law behavior.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
For the London Stock Exchange, we have shown that
large fluctuations in prices are unrelated to large transac-
tions, or to the placement of large orders. Instead, large
price fluctuations occur when there are gaps in the occu-
pied price levels in the limit order book. Large changes
occur when a market order removes all the volume at the
best price, creating a change in the best price equal to
the size of the gap.
At a higher level, these results demonstrate that large
price changes are driven by fluctuations in liquidity.
There are times when the market absorbs changes in sup-
ply and demand smoothly, and other times when a small
change in supply or demand can result in a very large
change in the price. This is due to the fact that supply
and demand functions are not smooth, but rather have
large, irregular steps and jumps. The market is granular,
due to the presence of only a finite number of occupied
price levels in the book. This is what in physics is called
a finite size effect. Even for an active stock such as AZN,
the number of occupied price levels on one side of the
book at any given time is typically about 30, and so the
system is far from the continuum limit. However, we
have shown that this is not a simple matter of fluctua-
tions in the number of occupied price levels; while there
is an approximate power law in the limit N → 0 in the
frequency for occupying N price levels, this is not suffi-
cient to explain fluctuations in prices. Instead, the power
law in gaps persists even when the number of occupied
levels is quite high, reflecting nontrivial correlations in
the positions of orders sitting in the book.
The empirical results that we have presented here raise
as many questions as they answer. In particular, what is
responsible for the approximate power law distribution
of gap sizes, and why do limit orders have the same tail
exponents as market orders and cancellations? We have
done some modeling to address this question. In partic-
ular, we have modified the statistical model of order flow
introduced by Daniels et al. [13, 58] to include nonuni-
form order placement, more closely reflecting the empir-
ical order placement distribution [6, 64], which has an
approximate power law tail. For some parameter values
our simulations reproduce the power law tails of the gap
distribution (and hence of returns), but since we do not
yet understand the necessary and sufficient conditions for
this, we do not include these results here.
The work presented here suggests that it is important
to properly model market institutions. However, at this
point it is not clear how these results would change for a
different market institution. Fat tails are also observed
in markets, such as the London Metals Exchange, that
follow very different exchange mechanisms14. While the
LSE follows a continuous double auction, it is our belief
that key elements are likely to persist with other market
mechanisms. In particular, we hypothesize that large
price fluctuations in any market are driven by liquidity
fluctuations, and that the granularity of fluctuations in
supply and demand remains the key factor underlying
extreme price fluctuations.
These results are important because they reveal the
detailed mechanism through which prices display (at
least approximate) power law fluctuations. They sug-
gest that many previous models that claimed to explain
this phenomenon were misdirected, and provide strong
constraints on future models. The tail exponent of large
price changes appears to depend on parameters of the
market: More lightly traded markets (with lower event
rates) tend to display fatter tails, with more extreme
risks. This has important practical importance because
it gives some understanding of what determines financial
risks, and gives some clues about how to reduce them.
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